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Althusser’s Marxism 
In this paper, I will explore the consequences of rethinking the alliance and 
relation between Marxism and psychoanalysis, and more concretely between 
Althusser and Lacan. It is part of an ongoing investigation and study on the 
contemporary relevance of Louis Althusser’s project. This study is driven by 
the following question: is Althusser’s work at all repeatable (in the Žižekian 
understanding of the term)? And if the answer is yes, then what is it in his 
project that remains thinkable in our conjuncture? This question becomes 
even more pressing given the revival of the interest in his work in recent years. 
Perhaps it would be safe to argue that the revival of the interest in Althusser is 
predominantly conditioned by the revival of the scholarship of one of his main 
philosophical influences, Spinoza. As a consequence, it is not surprising that 
the greatest Althusserian scholars are specialists in Spinoza. It suffices to recall 
his students Étienne Balibar and Pierre Macherey, whose works on Spinoza are 
perhaps one of the greatest outcomes of what can be called the Althusserian 
field. In this instance, the return to Althusser implies its conditioning to the 
oeuvre of Spinoza. But, there is another level, another practice, in and through 
which Althusser’s thought can gain a new dimension – pairing it with Lacanian 
psychoanalysis. 
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 But, let us focus for a moment on what makes the return to Althusser 
philosophically and politically worthy in the present conjuncture. Many of 
his critics have argued that Althusser’s Marx is an unknown Marx, or even an 
imaginary one. The Marx of which Althusser spoke, so they tell us, is an invented 
one, a Marx which cannot be found in his own writings. Perhaps the best-known 
example is that of his former student, Jacques Rancère, who in his Althusser’s 
Lesson sets out to comment on Althusser’s Marxism, which according to 
him, was misleading, a Marxism of closure, as it were.1 It was a violent act of 
separating the paths, where Rancière accuses his former teacher of elitism, and 
sets to work out his theory in which there is no place for a “master” to speak to 
the masses, but the masses themselves go through subjectivisation. 
 In his autobiography, Althusser repeats several times that his knowledge 
on Marx was fairly limited. However, following Althusser’s own lesson, we 
should reject this claim of its importance2 and strip him off from the position 
of  authority of his own thought. It is also important to note that later in his 
life Althusser became very critical of his concept of the epistemological break 
and came to admit that Marx did not break away from Hegel (and Feuerbach). 
Decisive in this ‘conversion’ was Jacques Bidet’s Que faire du ‘Capital’?.3 
 Regardless of whether Althusser has read Marx correctly, or read him 
at all, he was able to formulate some of the most profound and sophisticated 
epistemological, political and philosophical theses of the time. And this is what 
should be of our concern: not the true Marx, but the best Marx, as Robert Pfaller 
brilliantly argues.4 To supplement, or rather to advance further Pfaller’s thesis, 
I would argue that whatever Marx we get in Althusser’s writings, it is not a 
Marx without Marxism, a depoliticized and culturalized Marx. To write about 
Althusser is to write about a Communist militant who also did philosophy. And 
this is the crucial element as well as the true difficulty in re-reading Althusser’s 
work, regardless of the seasonal trend which is currently declaring him to 
be relevant. In our “neurotic obsessive” predicament, the true philosophical 
gesture is to avoid both a thoughtless acceptance of a master’s thinking or 
the metonymical displacement from master to master.  From the standpoint 
of historical materialism, far more interesting than critiquing these trends 
and to a certain degree pointing out on their ‘falsity’, is to focus on reading 
and interpreting them as indicators par excellence of the work of ideology in 
(our) situation. Again, it is easy to demonstrate the limits of Althusser – and 
many have done so – but it is much more productive to engage with precisely 
those limits and work through them. There is only one way in which we can 
understand Althusser’s work (Marx’s too, for that matter). Marx writes that “in 
so far as political economy is bourgeois, i.e., in so far as it views the capitalist 
order as the absolute and ultimate form of social production, instead of as 
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a historically transient stage of development, it can only remain a science 
while the class struggle remains latent or manifests itself only in isolated and 
sporadic phenomena.”5 Althusser cannot be read from a neutral position, or out 
of “objective knowledge”, but one has to be engaged, which in his own terms 
would be that to read Althusser means to occupy a position in philosophy and 
politics. Only from a partial position within the conjuncture of our time, one 
can read Althusser (and Marx). In other words, it is only from the proletarian 
position in philosophy (and politics) that one can read and understand Marxism 
in general, Althusser included. In older times, this position had a name: it was 
called a partisan position. 
 Althusser’s work stood for a double breakthrough: on the one hand, 
he was able to break away with orthodox Marxism, and fight against the 
‘spontaneous ideology’ of post-68 capitalism, postmodernism on the one - and, 
on the other hand, it was able to continue thinking through the ambitions that 
characterized the previous sequences of Marxist theory. My thesis thus runs 
as follows: the return to Althusser in the contemporary philosophical-political 
conjuncture means the confrontation with that kind of current on the Left which 
has abandoned the difficult task of rethinking the difficult Marxist categories 
(i.e. exploitation, class formation and class struggle, et cetera). In this regard, it 
is our task to proceed from where he left off. Most of his critics (and the same 
holds for the majority of critiques towards Slavoj Žižek) presume that the road 
to socialism is clear and we need to stick to the old understanding of class, 
socialism, class struggle, etc. This is the point in which we should insist, more 
than ever, in the crucial importance of pure thinking, that is to say, to paraphrase 
Hegel, in philosophy without further determinations. Or, to quote Althusser, 
“Marxist theory can fall behind history, and even behind itself, if ever it believes 
that it has arrived.”6
 We can speak of the limits of Althusser, and we should do so, but we 
should always bear in mind that in a given instance, the limits of Althusser’s 
project are simultaneously the limits of the 20th century socialist experiments. 
In this regard, the critique of Althusser’s project should be done simultaneously 
with the critique of the previous century socialism. 
Marxism and Psychoanalysis 
Psychoanalysis (and especially the Freudian-Lacanian one) and Marxism have 
a very complicated relation. There are many attempts which try to couple 
Marxism and psychoanalysis. Ernesto Laclau, for example, in his short text 
Psychoanalysis and Marxism suggests that the only way to think the relation 
between psychoanalysis and Marxism is through what, following Heidegger, 
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he calls “de-struction” of the history of Marxism, which means going beyond 
classical concepts such as “class”, “capital”, etc. In other words, for Laclau, it is 
post-Marxism as the political field which can co-exist, or more precisely intersect 
with psychoanalysis.7 For Laclau, the dialogue between the two disciplines is 
possible only under that condition.
 The next point to be made here, already criticized by Žižek, concerns the 
attempt to find points of intersection and supplements between psychoanalysis 
and Marxism. One of the most common ways to understand this relation is to 
understand psychoanalysis as a supplement to Marxism. An almost classical 
example would be to take a situation in which the “objective conditions” for the 
revolution exist, but the revolution doesn’t take place. Usually, it is expected that 
psychoanalysis will provide the coherent explanation for the failure. Following 
this logic would imply that both psychoanalysis and Marxism are untenable in 
themselves, that both disciplines are in structural crisis, unable to answer to 
the new developments in our societies, and that help from another discipline is 
needed. Rejecting the two above-mentioned cases, this paper starts from the 
following premise: there is no a priori compatibility between Freud and Marx, 
and Lacan and Althusser. One cannot read Marx’s and Freud’s “fetish” as the 
same or complementary concepts; or surplus-value with surplus-enjoyment. 
Nor simply trying to find sentences in Lacan and Marx, which could serve as a 
support of one’s argument. As a philosopher once said everything resembles 
everything else in one way or another... but this means simply nothing. A much 
more refined dialectics should be put to work in order to reconcile both Freud/
Lacan with Marx and Marx with Hegel, which goes well beyond the focus and 
the aims of this paper. This also means that there is no such thing as the “Marxist 
side” of Lacan as seen in his Seminar XVII, which is the Seminar in which the trio 
of Freud, Hegel and Marx are overly present. 
 The structure of psychoanalysis and that of Marxism are different. It 
is unimaginable for analysands to revolt on the couch, as do the workers in 
the factories. It is equally unconceivable for the analysands to get organised 
in a union or a Party, like the proletariat does. There is no natural affinity 
between the two disciplines. Simply put: the object of psychoanalysis is the 
unconscious, whereas for Marxism, it is the class struggle. In this sense, it seems 
to be rather difficult to imagine a class struggle in the field of the unconscious. 
This is the error of Wilhelm Reich, who attempted to locate the effects of the 
unconscious (Freud) with the effects of class struggle (Marx). No wonder that 
for him, the sexual liberation is associated also with the proletarian revolution, 
and the post-Bolshevik revolution was its realisation. For Lenin as well as 
for Althusser (although one can trace this back to Marx), the class struggle 
exists in three domains: economic, political and theoretical. Todd McGowan 
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provides an excellent account for the differences between Freud and Marx: 
“What distinguishes both Marx and Freud as thinkers is their understanding 
of social antagonisms. Where Freud sees antagonism manifesting itself in the 
excessive suffering of the individual subject, Marx sees it playing out in class 
struggle.”8 It is in this sense that McGowan aims to formulate the political theory 
of psychoanalysis, which is based on the Freudian concept of the death-drive. 
The inability to think and incorporate the death-drive in its project, represents 
the fundamental limitation of Marxism, McGowan argues: “The politics of 
psychoanalysis after Marxism is an emancipatory project based on the self-
sacrificing enjoyment located in the death drive. Marxism is able to theorize 
sacrifice as necessary for future pleasure, but it is unable to conceive sacrifice as 
an end in itself, as a source of enjoyment.”9
 Marxism is concerned with the class struggle and the working class taking 
over the state power. In other words, Marxism aims to grasp the effects of the 
class struggle. On the other hand, psychoanalysis begins and is concerned with 
individuals (analysands) and their sufferings. 
 But, are Marxism and psychoanalysis founded in such antagonistic 
positions as many are inclined to think?10 In 1976 Althusser wrote a short 
essay entitled On Freud and Marx. This is one of his most important essays, 
but as it often happens, it remains largely forgotten, if not repressed both by 
Lacanians and Althusserians. Althusser argues that, like Marx, Freud offered us 
an example of thought in dialectical materialism. For Althusser, Freud is truly a 
materialist because he rejects the primacy of consciousness, whereas the use 
of the categories of displacement, overdetermination, condensation and so on, 
belong to the field of the dialectic. But, there is another dimension to this paper, 
which is far more important for determining the field in which Marxism and 
psychoanalysis can intersect and co-exist. According to Althusser, the two other 
elements that Marxism and (Freudian) psychoanalysis have in common are a) 
they are both conflictual sciences, and b) their ultimate enemy is not an external 
attack, but revisionism:
It is a fact of experience that Freudian theory is a conflictual theory. 
From the time of its birth, and the phenomenon has not ceased to 
reproduce itself, it has provoked not only strong resistance, not 
only attacks and criticisms but, what is more interesting, attempts 
at annexation and revision. I say that the attempts at annexation 
and revision are more interesting than simple attacks and criticisms, 
for they signify that Freudian theory contains, by the admission 
of its adversaries, something true and dangerous. Where there is 
nothing true, there is no reason to annex or revise. There is therefore 
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something true in Freud that must ge appropriated but in order that 
its meaning may be revised, for this truth is dangerouos: it must be 
revised in order to be neutralized. There is a relentless dialectic in this 
cycle. For what is remarkable in the dialectic of resistance-criticism-
revision is that the phenomenon that begins outside of Freudian 
theory (with its adversaries) always ends up within Freudian theory. 
It is internally that Freudian theory is obliged to defend itself against 
attempts at annexation and revision: the adversary always ends up 
by penetrating it and producing a revisionism that provokes internal 
counterattacks and, finally, splits (scissions). A conflictual science, 
Freudian theory is also a scissional science and its history is marked by 
incessantly recurring splits.11
The same holds for Marxism, too. For Althusser, both Marxism and Freudian 
theory, have to defend themselves from themselves, as it were, from their inner 
deviations. He held that a rupture was inherent in psychoanalytic theory, as well 
as in Marxism; they are both situations in the very field in which they recognise 
as conflictual. It is for this reason that Althusser maintains that some practices 
need their concepts of such practices, in order to defend themselves against 
revisionism, opportunisms, et cetera. 
 A useful reference to Badiou can be done here. In his Theory of the 
Subject, Badiou makes a reference to the “black sheep of materialism”, where 
he says that Marxists should move beyond the linguistic idealism that has set in 
after the “discursive materialism” of Lacan, Foucault, Althusser, etc. For Badiou, 
only a materialist theory of the subject will divide the idealinguisterie into its 
deal and material aspects, opening up to a renewal of Marxism again.12
 From this, we should proceed to the equally complicated duo, the relation 
between Althusser and Lacan is controversial and certainly not clarified in the 
terms of philosophical overlappings and influences, as well as the formation of 
the thinkers based on the writings of the other. This means that my aim is not to 
reconstruct the Althusser-Lacan relation, the influences of one onto another and 
vice versa. It will not be concerned with the concept of interpellation, or with the 
debts to Lacan of Althusser’s conceptualisation of ideology, or with his readings 
of Freud and Lacan. To date, the most productive debate between Lacanians 
and Althusserians is reflected in the debate on the concept of interpellation 
between Mladen Dolar and Slavoj Žižek on the one hand, and Robert Pfaller on 
the other.13 
 In Seminar XX, Lacan makes a very interesting point, drawing parallels 
between Marx and Lenin, Freud and himself: “Marx and Lenin, Freud and Lacan 
are not coupled in being. It is via the letter they found in the Other that, as 
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beings of knowledge, they proceed two by two, in a supposed Other.”14 We 
should read this is from the perspective of the dialectical distinction between 
the founding figure and the formalization figure, introduced by Slavoj Žižek.15 
In Marxism, it was Lenin who formalized Marx with the party-form organisation 
and intervention in the historical situation; in psychoanalysis, it was Lacan 
who formalized Freud; and in Christianity, Christ was formalised by St.Paul. In 
this sense, we can introduce a new level, which connects both practices. With 
Althusser’s Marxism and Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory, we are dealing with 
a relation that is unable to surpass its founding figures (Marx, Freud). Every 
reformulation, ‘correction’, and advancement goes not through a refusal, but 
to a ‘return’ (to Marx with Althusser, to Freud with Lacan). In epistemological 
terms, the knowledge of both theories is constitutively antagonistic, that is to 
say, errors are always-already part of the ‘real’ knowledge, which to repeat the 
previous claim of Althusser, revisionism is in a certain sense a constitutive part 
of the discipline. Marxism and psychoanalysis are ‘unique’ in the sense that they 
both determine the limitations of themselves, and they work through them to 
open them up. 
 In an apparent level, there is no such thing as a philosophical foundation 
of Marxism and psychoanalysis; they exist on another theoretical level and 
practice. In Lacanian practice, the end of psychoanalysis, or the dissolution of 
transference happens when the analysand comes to experience how the big 
Other (analyst) doesn’t have the truth about his/her desire. That is to say, how 
the desire of the analysand has neither guarantees nor grounds, it exists only 
as authorised by him/herself. The desire of the analysands has no support in 
the Other and he’s the instance of its authorisation. In this sense, we have a 
shift from the epistemological level to the ontological one. Or in psychoanalytic 
terms, the end of psychoanalysis is the shift from the desire to the drive. 
Marxism aims at transforming the object which “constitutes” it, thus at the same 
time, it gives rise to the revolutionary agent. 
 The contemporary Left dreams of a society in which social pathologies, 
neurosis, psychoses are eradicated. That the happy socialist paradise of 
equality also implies the well-being and happiness of all. But, let us cite Freud: 
“You will be able to convince yourself that much will be gained if we succeed 
in transforming your hysterical misery into common unhappiness. With a 
mental life that has been restored to health you will be better armed against 
that unhappiness.”  If we replace three words from Freud’s passage about the 
purposes of analysis with the purposes of communism, we get the following 
result: You will be able to convince yourself that much will be gained if we 
succeed in transforming expropriation of labour into common unhappiness. With 
a social life that has been restored to justice you will be better armed against 
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM
Volume 1, Issue 1: What Does Intellectual Freedom Mean Today? A Provocation
144
that unhappiness.16 That is, one of the most important aspects of communism is 
to include the discontent into society. Discontent as such will never disappear, 
but we can utilize it for more creative and progressive purposes. This brings us 
to a crucial dimension of Marxism as well as psychoanalysis, that of the practice. 
 But, before we proceed with it, let us pause for a moment and point 
out a curious detail which points to a rather interesting difference between 
Althusserianism and Lacanianism. As we said earlier, Marxism, as the theory 
of Communism, is concerned with masses and classes, whereas two people 
constitute the psychoanalytic practice. Now comes the paradox of Althusser: 
unlike Lacan, Althusser didn’t think of establishing his school or unifying his 
philosophy in a formal system. This is why François Matheron can claim, “the 
field of Althusserian studies has still not been constituted.”17  Against developing 
a philosophical system, Althusser chose another path: that of philosophically 
intervening in particular political, ideological and philosophical conjunctures. 
In other words, a renewed Marxism would be of interest to all, but no 
systematization that would allow for this was made, while analysis is of interest 
to a few, but it was formalized to be available to all. Given the “interventionist” 
aspect of Althusserian philosophy and Marxism, I would argue that the 
“Althusserian” field is never fully constituted, but it exists only insofar as it is in 
constitution. In this sense relies on of their crucial differences. 
On the Dialectical Materialism 
One of the most important aspects of Althusser’s work is the major switch from 
dialectical materialism to materialism of the encounter. Faced with the crisis of 
Marxism in 1970, he chose to abandon his philosophical apparatus of dialectical 
materialism and pursue another path; that of aleatory materialism, while at the 
same time remaining a Communist. In his text Limits of Marx, he announced that 
“at last the crisis of Marxism has exploded.” As a result, he sought to rethink the 
potential of Marx’s thought and Marxism in general. Althusser was seeking for, to 
paraphrase Badiou, new forms of political and philosophical subjectivity, without 
and free from the confines of the “theoretical monstrosity” called dialectical 
materialism.18  
 Let us make a short detour into the main core of Althusser’s 
understanding of dialectical materialism.19 In an essay called Materialist 
Dialectics, Louis Althusser defines practice from the standpoint of a certain 
notion of rule (all practices, theoretical and ideological included, transform 
a raw material into a determinate product). Departing from this, we could 
criticize the theory of transformation as being the notion of concrete labour in 
capitalism. Isn’t it the capitalist mode of production that has created the theory 
145
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM
Lacan Contra Althusser: Dialectical Materialism vs Nominalism
of abstract labour, which is this general pattern all activities are supposed to 
carry as their infra-structure (the pattern of transforming an indeterminate 
x into a determinate y)? What if militant work requires a different theory of 
transformation in order to break away from the capitalist mode of production? 
Let us proceed with the beginning of Althusser’s essay, which, in line with the 
“spirit of previous century Marxism”, he gives either an outline or an attempt 
towards something. He begins this important essay with a very complicated 
proposal, which in fact condenses the whole problematic of dialectical 
materialism: 
This article proposes the term Theory (with a capital T to designate 
Marxist ‘philosophy’ (dialectical materialism) – and reserves the term 
philosophy for ideological philosophies.20
But, what does a practice means? Let us quote a longer passage, which can 
shed light to this definition as well as to his remarks on Lacan:
“I shall call Theory (with a capital T), general theory, that is, the Theory 
of practice in general, itself elaborated on the basis of the Theory of 
existing theoretical practices (of the sciences), which transforms into 
‘knowledges’ (scientific truths) the ideological product of existing 
‘empirical’ practices (the concrete activity of men). This Theory is the 
materialist dialectic which is none other than dialectical materialism. 
These definitions are necessary for us to be able to give an answer 
to this question: what is the use of a theoretical expression of a 
solution which already exists in the practical state? – an answer with a 
theoretical basis.21
Notice the strange equivalence of dialectical materialism and materialist 
dialectic.22 Should it be read as one and the same concept? Althusser is talking 
about a specific form of dialectics and equally a specific form of materialism. 
But, we should be precise on this point: for Althusser, “Marxism-Leninism has 
always subordinated the dialectical Theses to the materialist Theses.” This leads 
us to another crucial aspect, that of the relation between the thought and 
practice:
The exact theoretical expression of the dialectic is relevant first of all 
to those practices in which the Marxist dialectic is active; for these 
practices (Marxist ‘theory’ and politics) need the concept of their 
practice (of the dialectic) in their development, if they are not to find 
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themselves defenseless in the face of qualitatively new forms of this 
development (new situations, new ‘problems’) – or to lapse, or relapse, 
into the various forms of opportunism, theoretical or practical. These 
‘surprises’ and deviations, attributable in the last resort to ‘ideological 
errors’, that is, to a theoretical deficiency, are always costly, and may 
be very costly.23
Theory (with a capital T) is not the opposite of practice, the determinant field/
aspect, but it is the ground upon which the practice itself is constituted, that 
is to say, where the production and ‘manifestation’ of knowledge is always-
already part of the practice as such. As he himself puts it, “theory is important to 
practice in a double sense: for ‘theory’ is important to its own practice, directly. 
 But the relation of a ‘theory’ to its practice, in so far as it is at issue, on 
condition that it is reflected and expressed, is also relevant to the general 
Theory (the dialectic) in which is theoretically expressed the essence of 
theoretical practice in general, through it the essence of practice in general, and 
through it the essence of the transformations, of the ‘development’ of things in 
general.”24
 This should be further understood against the common sense 
understanding of both theory (i.e. ‘critical theory’, which Althusser would qualify 
as a ‘spontaneous ideology of theorists’) and practice (the conviction that 
the Left has to be done away with theory and engage in the real and actual 
transformation of the world.) 
 Let us proceed in a schematic fashion, dear to Althusser himself, in order 
to recapitulate this problematic. 
 Philosophy declares positions, whereas theory produces problems. This 
is a very rigid and mechanical distinction but it might well provide us with the 
background. Althusser coined a new concept: his materialism is now called 
Theory, with a capital T. His materialism is Marxist philosophy, as he argues 
in the opening of this essay. Althusser is concerned with resolving problems 
through Marxist practice:
By practice in general I shall mean any process of transformation 
of determinate given raw material into a determinate product, a 
transformation effected by a determinate human labour, using 
determinate means (of ‘production’). In any practice thus conceived, 
the determinant moment (or element) is neither the raw material nor 
the product, but the practice in the narrow sense: the moment of 
the labour of transformation itself, which sets to work, in a specific 
structure, men, means and a technical method of utilizing the means. 
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This general definition of practice covers the possibility of particularity: 
there are different practices which are really distinct, even though they 
belong organically to the same complex totality. Thus, ‘social practice’, 
the complex unity of the practices existing in a determinate society, 
contains a large number of distinct practices. This complex unity of 
‘social practice’ is structured, we shall soon see how, in such a way 
that in the last resort the determinant practice in it is the practice of 
transformation of a given nature (raw material) into useful products by 
the activity of living men working through the methodically organized 
employment of determinate means of production within the framework 
of determinate relations of production.25 
Then he goes on arguing that
As well as production social practice includes other essential levels: 
political practice – which in Marxist parties is no longer spontaneous 
but organized on the basis of the scientific theory of historical 
materialism, and which transforms its raw materials: social relations, 
into a determinate product (new social relations); ideological practice 
(ideology, whether religious, political, moral, legal or artistic, also 
transforms its object: men’s ‘consciousness’): and finally, theoretical 
practice. Ideology is not always taken seriously as an existing practice: 
but to recognize this is the indispensable prior condition for any theory 
of ideology. The existence of a theoretical practice is taken seriously 
even more rarely: but this prior condition is indispensable to an 
understanding of what theory itself, and its relation to ‘social practice’ 
are for Marxism.26
Following this, the work of Althusser, and especially his For Marx and 
Reading Capital should be understood as a critique of both hitherto existing 
conceptualisation of dialectical materialism and historical materialism, as 
well as the development of philosophical theses which guarantee and further 
develop the scientificity of Marx’s historical materialism and it’s philosophical 
“effect”, dialectical materialism. In order to break away with the philosophical 
and political obstacles in which it was caught, and freeing it from the various 
forms of deviations, Althusser announced a philosophical, that is, a historical and 
epistemological reading of Marx. The relation between science and philosophy 
is clear: philosophy goes through a radical transformation after every scientific 
breakthrough and science is the condition of philosophy. In other words, 
philosophy exists only under the conditions of science and politics.
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 The distinction between science and philosophy compels Althusser to 
call Marx a scientist and not a philosopher. For him, historical materialism is a 
science, the science of history, which was inaugurated by Marx in 1845, placing 
Marx in the same category as Thales, Galileo, and so on. That said, he sets 
the primacy of the science of history, with philosophy which accompanies it, 
i.e. dialectical materialism. The latter is always underdeveloped in relation to 
the former. In this sense, dialectical materialism is always behind. As he puts 
it elsewhere apropos the relation between science and philosophy, this is a 
determinate situation for philosophy: “Outside of its relationship to the sciences, 
philosophy would not exist.” Or, as he puts it in Reading Capital, “the theoretical 
future of historical materialism depends today on deepening dialectical 
materialism, which itself depends on a rigorous critical study of Capital. History 
imposes this immense task on us. Insofar as our modest means will allow, we 
should like to make our contribution.”27 
 The crucial question runs as follows: why did Althusser have to abandon 
dialectical materialism in favour of the materialism of the encounter? It seems 
to have to do with nominalisms’ absolute homogeneity and immanence (all is in 
the same plane) while the “Theory of practice” which tries to put all practices at 
the same level (theory becomes one form of practice), but still keeps a certain 
difference between them, might not have been “immanentist” enough for his 
materialism, because it only writes the determinate moments (practice and 
theoretical practice) and not the indeterminate (or aleatory) ones (which he 
thinks nominalism can write or think more directly.)
 Many of his commentators pointed out the continuity in Althusser’s 
thought, that is to say, they find elements of the materialism of the encounter 
from the 1960s. For G.M.Goshgarian, a translator and commentator of 
Althusser’s work, insists that from 1970 Althusser transformed his philosophy 
and thus reformulated his dialectical materialism into materialism of the 
encounter. In his understanding, only by reading Althusser’s late texts are we 
able to understand Althusser’s earlier philosophical periods.28 The question of 
continuity in Althusser’s work in general, and particularly with regard to the 
presence of aleatory materialism throughout his work is a very difficult one. 
One of the ways to properly understand the continuity is if we emphasise the 
question of materialism and the practice it requires in order to be the philosophy 
of our time. In my understanding, this radical shift in his work remains one of 
the most important aspects in the whole of the Althusserian project. Due to the 
scope of this essay, I will limit myself to a few propositions.
The first one concerns his understanding of practice. If we explore the 
consequences of rethinking its notion based on the Lacanian and Žižekian 
psychoanalytical and philosophical thought - especially considering the theory 
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of the drives, where means and ends can be inverted, and the theory of the 
subject, where the result of a transformation is not always determined, but is 
sometimes negative and elusive - we come to understand his limits. 
 Another aspect is, to understand it along the lines of the crisis of Marxism, 
in which Althusser, while completely recognising it, remained unquestionably 
loyal to Communism and the proletarian position in philosophy. Thus, aleatory 
materialism should be understood as his (last) attempt to rethink the communist 
project. 
 What is the materialism that Althusser defends in his late writings? 
In his autobiography, writing on Spinoza, Althusser says that:
he was also a nominalist, and Marx taught me that nominalism was the 
royal road to materialism. In fact, it leads only to itself, but I can think 
of hardly any more profound form of materialism than nominalism. 
Without offering any explanation of the origins of its meaning, 
Spinoza declared: ‘We have a true idea’, a ‘norm of truth’ provided by 
mathematics - yet another fact offered without any explanation of its 
transcendental origins. What is more, he was a man who believed in 
the facticity of facts, which was astonishing in a supposedly dogmatic 
person who deduced the existence of the world from God and his 
attributes! Nothing could be more materialist than this thought without 
origin or end.29
The basic thesis of nominalism is “there are only cases”, which Althusser borrows 
from Wittgenstein’s “the world is everything that is a case”. For him, this is a 
“superb sentence says everything.”30  When asked about his understanding 
and conceptualisation of nominalism and Marx’s thesis that nominalism is the 
antechamber of materialism, Althusser gives the following elaboration:
Precisely; and I would go still further. I would say that it is not merely 
the antechamber of materialism, but materialism itself. Certain 
ethnologists have made a striking observation: that in the most 
primitive of observable societies, those of the Australian Aborigines 
or African Pygmies, nominalist philosophy seems to hold sway in 
person - not only at the level of thought, that is, of language, but also 
in practice, in reality. Conclusive recent studies have shown that, for 
these societies, there exist only singular entities, and each singularity, 
each particularity, is designated by a word that is equally singular. 
Thus the world consists exclusively of singular, unique objects, each 
with its own specific name and singular properties. ‘Here and now’, 
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which, ultimately, cannot be named, but only pointed to, because 
words themselves are abstractions - we would have to be able to 
speak without words, that is, to show. This indicates the primacy of the 
gesture over the word, of the material trace over the sign.31 
Our position towards this thesis should be: Althusser became the Althusser only 
with For Marx and Reading Capital. His aleatory materialism should be subjected 
to the same critique to which he subjected his earlier period and especially to 
dialectical materialism. And an unexpected ally emerges here: Jacques Lacan. 
In (an unpublished) Seminar XVIII from 1971, Lacan critiques Althusser from the 
standpoint of (none other than) dialectical materialism:
If there is something I am, it is clear that I am not a nominalist. What I 
want to say is that my starting point is not that the name is something 
like a nameplate which attaches itself, just like that, onto the real. 
And one has to choose. If one is a nominalist, one has to renounce 
completely dialectical materialism, so that, all in all, I evidently reject 
the nominalist tradition which is effectively the only danger of idealism 
which can arise in a discourse like mine. The point is not to be a 
realist in the sense in which one was a realist in Medieval times, in the 
sense of the realism of the universals; the point is to emphasize that 
our discourse, our scientific discourse, can only find the real insofar 
as it depends on the function of the semblant. The articulation, and 
I mean the algebraic articulation, of the semblant-and because of 
this we are only dealing with letters-and its effects, this is the only 
apparatus which enables us to designate what is real. What is real is 
what opens up a hole in this semblant, in this articulated semblant 
which is the scientific discourse. The scientific discourse progresses 
without even worrying if it is a discourse of semblance or not. All that 
matters is that its network, its texture, its lattice, as one is used to say, 
makes the right holes appear at the right place. The only reference 
reached by its deductions is the impossible. This impossible is the 
real. In physics, we aim at something which is real with the help of the 
discursive apparatus which, in its crispness, encounters the limits of its 
consistency.32 
What is Lacan really saying with this? Lacan touches on one of the most 
important aspects of the philosophical ‘debate’, precisely because he takes a 
position which is anti-Althusser and anti-Foucault, to mention just the two. The 
sense in which Lacan is not a nominalist, is 
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not to be a realist in the medieval sense, but in the sense that our 
(scientific) discourse “can only find the real insofar as it depends on 
the function of the semblant”: reality is a semblant, but not in the 
simple sense that it is a deceptive appearance hiding true Being-there 
is nothing, no true substantial real, behind the veil of phenomenal 
reality. Reality is a semblant in the sense that its structure already 
materializes a certain fantasy which obfuscates the Real of a social 
antagonism. This is why we “can only find the real insofar as it 
depends on the function of the semblant”: by way of identifying the 
impossibilities, cracks, antagonisms which underlie and generate the 
inconsistent multiplicity of semblants.33 
For Lacan, there are not only particulars and the reality itself, but there are 
social antagonisms, which do not exist “as a case”, but that one has to refer to. 
To formulate it differently, there are many particularities which try to resolve 
the same antagonism, and Žižek’s example here is that of modernity. There are 
different ways which try to deal with capitalist modernity and its antagonisms: 
one is liberal democracy which argues that liberal freedoms will ‘tame’ class 
struggle, the other way is that of fascism (capitalism without class struggle/
antagonisms), and so forth. All these are various attempts to handle the same 
central antagonism. In Lacan’s terms, this is the universality, which for him, is 
always the Real. 
 Now, to go back to our previous argument on the theory of the drives, 
which could be the crucial path which could solve this problem. Let us propose 
a thesis, by which we will end this paper: the Lacanian ontology of drives, given 
its immanent and transcendent aspect at the same time, is the ontology that 
solves the problem of nominalism in Althusserian philosophy. But, the question 
that remains unanswered is that about the relation between the death drive and 
practice. In what follows, I will propose a few ‘working thesis.’
 Freud’s pleasure principle and its beyond, that is the death drive, has 
been an object of various interpretations. Gilles Deleuze argues that everything 
cannot be neither accounted for, nor governed by the pleasure principle. But, 
the Freud’s position is that in order to account for the pleasure principle, a more 
radical dimension has to be posited: that of the death drive and the compulsion 
to repeat, which makes it possible for the pleasure principle to act. 
 But what is the drive, and more precisely, the death drive? The death 
drives appears with the subjectivity, just as the subject enters or is alienated 
into the symbolic order. The constitution of the subject into the symbolic 
order is traumatic, it presents a loss of something which one doesn’t have, an 
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originary loss, and this is the point at which death drives aims at. This is why the 
repetition, which is a part of the death drive, is not the repetition of the same, 
but the repetition of the originary loss, which is the ‘source’ of enjoyment. 
 The drive is that something which persists, goes on even after the 
psychoanalytic session is over, that is, after the ‘traversing the fantasy’. In 
Seminar XI asks “What, then, does he who has passed through the experience 
of this opaque relation to the origin, to the drive, become? How can a subject 
who has traversed the radical phantasy experience the drive? This is the beyond 
of analysis, and has never been approached.”34  Lacan’s wager is: at the end of 
psychoanalysis, after traversing the fantasy, the desire is transformed into drive.
 Neurotics always take the desire for demand. He mistakenly looks for a 
desire, where the field of that of the drive. But the desire always begins with a 
misrecognition, it is always-part of the nature of the desire. The neurotic does so 
because s/he believes in the loss of an object, but they fail to see that the object 
become such only through the loss. In this sense, it tries to do away with the 
drive by reducing desire to the desire of and for something, and thereby s/he 
works with the ideals alone, i.e. the ideal of the lost object. Desire always looks 
for a new object, object which would satisfy its needs. But, if this object were 
to be ‘found’, the desire would cease being such. For this reason, desire doesn’t 
attempt satisfaction, but it attempts to maintain itself as a desire. It is always an 
imaginary anticipation of that which would realise a given want, or an imaginary 
sense of fulfilment. Any practice that is not based on this, would and shall be a 
practice that is not based on ideals. And perhaps, this is what Althusser wanted.
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